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Abstract This paper puts forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of
expertise and experts in contemporary societies. It argues that while prevailing
approaches have come to see expertise in various forms and functions, they tend to
neglect the broader historical and societal context, and importantly the relational
aspect of expertise. This will be discussed with regard to influential theoretical
frameworks, such as laboratory studies, regulatory science, lay expertise, post-
normal science, and honest brokers. An alternative framework of expertise is
introduced, showing the limitations of existing frameworks and emphasizing one
crucial element of all expertise, which is their role in guiding action.
Keywords Experts  Expertise  Science  Knowledge  Knowledge societies 
Decision-making  STS
Introduction
The question what expertise is and what experts do, what role they play in society
and what role they should play is a recurrent theme not only in the recent literature.
Authors argue about the desirability of recognition of specific forms of knowledge
and expertise and their proper place in the decision-making process in modern
societies. Many debates have revolved around the question if experts should have a
privileged position in democracies. Such questions take for granted that we know
what experts are and in which social context they operate. The argument put
forward here claims that we need to go back to basics. We need to understand
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expertise more deeply and contextualize it in modern society and the sociological
literature. I will develop a framework that allows us to better understand how
expertise emerges and how it works in society, what its main characteristics are, and
how it relates to common notions of scientific and professional expertise.
The paper has the following structure. I will first provide a definition of expertise,
which I link to a sociological account of what has been called the rise of the knowledge
society. My effort is indebted to a line of thought that includes authors such as Daniel
Bell, Peter Drucker, and Nico Stehr. I will then show, by way of a critical review, how
several influential frameworks from the field of Science and Technology Studies
(STS), broadly conceived, have conceptualised expertise. The limitations of these
approaches will be discussed and confronted with a relational concept of expertise.
What are Experts and What do They do?
Definitions of expertise usually revolve around the specialist craft or knowledge a
person is said to possess. An often-used synonym is specialist. The opposite of an
expert or specialist is an amateur, or a layperson (the term lay expert in this sense is
an oxymoron). These characteristics of being a specialist apply to several roles in
modern society, especially the professional and the scientist. Sometimes experts are
thought to have moral virtue, besides their technical competence. This virtue can be
captured by terms such as disinterestedness or impartiality1 (Collins 2014a,b; Laski
1930; Nelkin 1975; Shapin 2008; Turner 2001).
From this short overview the following list of issues can be derived:
(1) There is a fundamental difference between experts and non-experts; (2)
experts are located in the professions and in science; (3) experts possess technical
skills, including manual and intellectual skills; (4) experts are impartial which
makes their advice trustworthy. Within the remit of this paper not all issues can be
discussed in the same depth. I will focus on the knowledge dimension of expertise
and exclude manual skills from the discussion. And I will comment on the issue of
impartiality only in passing. What is missing from the above list are two crucial
relational aspects. The list above treats expertise as something that persons have, a
body of knowledge that can be attributed. However, expertise is essentially
something delivered at the request of someone else who wants it. This makes
expertise relational in a double sense: it relates to clients and it relates to their needs,
which often is the need for guidance in decision-making.2 It is the aim of this paper
to develop and explore this double relationship.
1 In addition, there are ‘moral experts’, such as a Kantian philosopher or a Catholic theologian, who are
experts but not impartial. Thanks to Mark Brown for this observation.
2 The notion of knowledge broker comes close to the problem but, at least in the definition of Meyer
(2010) is too focused on the cognitive aspects, and the translation of knowledge to audiences, leaving
aside the aspects of decision, advice and action. Meyer (2010) writes: ‘[B]rokering involves a range of
different practices: the identification and localization of knowledge, the redistribution and dissemination
of knowledge, and the rescaling and transformation of this knowledge. Brokering knowledge thus means
far more than simply moving knowledge—it also means transforming knowledge’.
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This relational concept can be summarized as follows: experts mediate between
the production of knowledge and its application; they define and interpret situations;
and they set priorities for action. Experts are primarily judged by clients, not
necessarily by peers (professional or scientific); and they rely on trust by their
clients (cf. Stehr and Grundmann 2011; see Martin 1973 for an early exposition). As
Martin (1973: 159) aptly remarked, ‘[e]xpertness is an ascribed quality, a badge,
which cannot be manufactured and affected by an expert himself, but rather only
can be received from another, a client’. Aristotle shrewdly remarked that ‘the guest
will judge better of a feast than the cook’.
Conventional examples of experts are science advisory bodies and consultants to
decision-makers, including legal counsellors and medical doctors. However, there is
an emerging form of expertise which becomes ever more important. This has been
described as lay expertise, and it has been thematized in the literature. Examples are
citizens being involved in risk decisions about health and the environment, but also
the growing number of Internet platforms on which citizens give advice based on
their own knowledge and experience, on matters ranging from finance to cultural
entertainment. Much of the academic literature on expertise implicitly or explicitly
wants to say something about the quality or desirability of specific forms of
expertise, often using scientific expertise as yardstick or model. This tends to
obscure vitally important aspects of expertise.
Peter Dear (2004) gives a definition of expert which emphasizes the importance
of personal experience and tacit knowledge. It also draws attention to the fact that an
expert is defined by others as an expert:
‘An expert . . . is someone who is reckoned to be likely to be experienced in
the relevant matters. … In effect, shared experience relies on the ability to
recognize a kind of attribute or property that people (‘‘experts’’) can be said to
possess. Expertise thus resembles ‘‘tacit knowledge’’ as understood by
scholars in science studies’ (Dear 2004: 206–207).
Many people may advertise themselves as experts but they will only be able to
play this role when a client starts to use their service (see Martin 1973). The expert
has thus to be trusted by a client—in contrast to a professional who is certified by a
professional organization (see the traditional definition by Abbott 1988; recent
scholarship sees challenges to the status of professions, e.g. Evetts 2011).
The word expert has its root in the Latin verb experiri, to try. An expertus is
someone who is experienced, has risked and endured something, is proven and
tested. Closely related is the word experimentum. The semantic field opened up
through this etymology has led to an emphasis on tacit knowledge and experiments,
which some STS scholars have emphasized as crucial component of scientific work.
This definition is restricting the meaning of expertise to the aspect of people in
possession of some kind of knowledge or skills.
But experts are not only characterised by their embodiment of skills and
experience. What matters is their performance. They are asked to share their
knowledge (or at least some of it) and advise others what to do. In this way
knowledge becomes a capacity to act (Stehr 1994). The Latin verb consulere means
to ask, to question or to examine; to give advice. And the verb consultare is used as
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a synonym for curare – to take care of someone, or to worry about someone. There
are well known social functions where professional roles refer to the term
consultant–for example, specialist doctors, consultants advising business firms, or
advisers of politicians. It is true that consultants draw on specialised knowledge, but
this knowledge need not be a comprehensive reflection of the current state of the
relevant science. Personal experience, judgement, and trustworthiness are much
more relevant. Because consultants are judged (and sometimes paid) by their clients,
past achievements, reliability and credibility are of vital importance. Using the term
expert as a synonym for consultant emphasises these aspects of the role.
Expertise thus defined contrasts not only with the notion that people possess
something (knowledge or skills), it also contrasts with the notion that expertise is
primarily linked to scientific activity. Of course, scientists may become experts in
that they advise clients. But often their advisory activity is only loosely related to
their core expertise, and clients request their advice because it bestows prestige and
legitimation.3 The scientists’ main activity is generating new scientific knowledge,
not necessarily creating advice for action or guiding decision-making. To put it in a
nutshell, there can be knowledge, and scientific knowledge, without expertise (see
Sassower 1993).
Classical sociologists were well aware of the difference between knowledge and
action. Marx (1867) proclaimed that in the beginning there was a decision: ‘In their
difficulties our commodity owners think like Faust: ‘‘Im Anfang war die Tat.’’ [‘‘In
the beginning was the deed.’’ – Goethe, Faust]’. They therefore acted and
transacted before they performed research. Durkheim said ‘Life cannot wait’
(Durkheim 1915: 431), and scientific knowledge is its opposite, characterized by
limited or even absent opportunities to take action. According to Durkheim, beliefs
provide the impetus for action, whereas science, ‘however far one might want to
pursue it . . . always keeps its distance from the action’.
Likewise, Simmel (1890: 1) thought that it is more important to a human being to
do something than to know how he managed to do it, and the insight into how the
action was accomplished comes afterward. Society cannot wait until its problems
are solved scientifically; it must decide which course of action to take. Scientific
knowledge operates under conditions that allow waiting, gaining of distance and
overview. The absence of urgency in scientific knowledge production makes science
seem inappropriate for situations in which urgency becomes the most important
characteristic. If we were waiting for conclusive evidence before taking action,
decision-making would be paralysed. Knowledge for action can only ever be ‘good
enough’, a judgement made by decision-makers with the help of experts (with
experts defined here and in the following as consultants and advisors, not research
scientists, although the latter are often performing such tasks). This pragmatist take
on knowledge and decision-making sums up the proposed framework for the
analysis of expertise.
3 See Kantrowitz (1975) for a discussion of this problem and the suggestion of an experimental
institution of a ‘science court’.
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Traditional, Industrial, and Knowledge Societies
Turning to the historical and social context of expertise, let me start with an
observation by Zygmunt Bauman. In his book Legislators and Interpreters, Bauman
(1987) writes about the role of the intellectual and introduces the terms ‘legislators’
and ‘interpreters’ in order to illustrate the difference between modern and post-
modern societies. In modern societies, Bauman suggests, the role of intellectual is
akin to the legislator, whereas in post-modern societies intellectuals are more like
interpreters (see also Osborne 2004). Similar to other theorists of postmodernity
Bauman points to the fact that different social forms lead to the emergence of
different forms and constellations of power and knowledge, and that post-modern
societies deny intellectuals the role of all-knowing, guiding and leading figures.
This is a useful sociological point of departure but needs to be more nuanced.
Instead of talking about modern and post-modern societies one should distinguish
between traditional, industrial and knowledge societies. One should also allow for
the possibility that former traits will continue in later stages of societal change. This
would mean that knowledge societies are likely to have elements of both traditional
and industrial societies. Rather than positing a rigid separation of forms of societies
and types of experts one should assume a mixture of them.
With regard to expertise this means that in a traditional society decisions are
justified by references to God, Nature, or the good life (Douglas 1966). Industrial
societies make references to wealth and health more prominent so that efficiency,
competition, inclusion and concerns about the consequences of the industrial mode
of production and its impacts on humans and the natural environment become
important (Beck 1992). In this society science appears as an arbiter in many
contentious issues, as Bauman’s role of ‘legislator’ indicates. Technocracy is the
name of the game.
As we move into the knowledge society religious or moral references have not
completely disappeared as one can observe in many debates, and arguments
continue about the leading role of science, allegedly providing some ‘rational’
guidance for society. But like Bauman’s intellectuals who have lost their role as
legislators, science has lost its position of authority. Partly this was due to
disillusionment with scientific and technological projects after the Second World
War, but also due to the emergence of a multiplicity of knowledge sources (Jensen,
Lahn, and Nerland 2012; Stehr and Grundmann 2011).4
Not only have knowledge sources proliferated, appeals to scientific expertise and
authority have become more problematic as a result of technical and environmental
disasters which have been blamed on a failure of scientific guidance or foresight. As
Camille Limoges pointed out,
4 In 2012, 41% of Americans expressed ‘‘a great deal of confidence’’ in leaders of the scientific
community; this proportion has stayed nearly stable over the last 40 years. Compared to other social
domains they do well (NSF 2014). Eurobarometer (2010) does not have directly comparable data. Asked
about controversial scientific and technological issues Europeans feel that scientists cannot be trusted to
tell the truth because they depend more and more on money from industry. More than half (58%) agrees
that this is the situation and only 16% disagree.
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‘There was a time when the mobilization of experts was a taken-for-granted,
unproblematic aspect of decision-making processes. Experts would ‘educate
the public’ and, in so doing, prevent the eruption of controversies. It is upon
such a basis that technology assessment, qua expert knowledge, was first
established. Confidence in the power of expertise has now vanished’ (Limoges
1993: 417).
Meanwhile, suspicion about scientists, engineers, politicians, and business corpo-
rations who use science in order to push an agenda, or to promote or undermine a
technology has become widespread. Dorothy Nelkin (1975: 36) said as much in the
mid-1970s: ‘[E]xperts are resented and feared. While the reliance on experts is
growing, we see a revival of Jacksonian hostility toward expertise, and of the belief
that common sense is an adequate substitute for technical knowledge’ (see also
Beck 1992; Collins 2014a,b; Goldacre 2012; Mirowski 2011; Wood and Mador
2013).5
However, suspicion about elite expertise is not the only feature of modern
societies. There is plenty of evidence that social change over the past decades has
made societies more knowledge dependent. New products embody higher inputs of
knowledge. Rising proportions of the population everywhere are university
graduates (Frank and Meyer 2007), a trend already diagnosed by Daniel Bell
(1973) and Peter Drucker (1968).
The pool of knowledgeable citizens has increased enormously between the 1960s
and today. Many more people are highly educated and earn their money as
‘knowledge workers’ (Brint 2001). At the same time, as traditional ties have been
loosened, people cannot rely on received wisdom and traditional ways of life. They
have to make decisions about their lives themselves. This trend towards
individualisation and risk decisions has been well described by Beck (1992),
Giddens (1991) and others. This means that individuals are seeking expertise, and
may find it being offered by non-certified experts. The trend is powerful and has not
spared the professions, either. They have been challenged by the growing number of
citizens some of whom have university degrees and are knowledgeable and
interested in issues that were left to professionals and scientists only a few decades
ago. As Jensen et al. (2012: 2) put it, ‘expert knowledge is generally contested and
branded with uncertainty. This is partly related to the emergence of the information
society, which paves the way for extensive distribution of knowledge and
information that is open to all without necessarily having gained the endorsement
of professional or institutional authorities’.
In contemporary society the reliance on expertise is ubiquitous, with people
being both potential providers and clients of expertise. Many social situations
require expert judgement, no matter if we look at career advisors in schools,
5 Collins (2014b) traces the suspicion of expertise to the 1960s counterculture and its legacy in today’s
social science scholarly community. While this captures one aspect of social context, it does not address
the deeper nature of social change that has led to a proliferation of knowledge sources. In other words, the
criticism of elite expertise (and the demand for ‘more democracy’) is not only a feature of social science
scholarship but also a social reality.
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financial advisors (pensions and mortgages), or partnership and marriage advisors.6
A recent study on a health campaign in Finland finds that ‘field experts’ are the most
visible actors in the media (Va¨liverronen 2014). These are nutrition therapists and
personal fitness trainers who ‘did not appear so much as sources of scientific
information, but instead as authorised users of that information. They gave advice,
encouraged citizens to record their weight, and offered quite detailed prescriptions
in their interviews of the sort of lifestyles people should lead in order to achieve
their ideal weight’ (Va¨liverronen 2014: 525).
The argument so far describes a paradoxical development: it lays out that the
emergence of the knowledge society has led to a proliferation of, and dependence on
expertise. It has led to a loss of trust in scientific experts while at the same time
generating forms of expertise that are not based on professional accreditation or
scientific reputation (see also Weingart 1999). On the supply side there is more
expertise on offer, including new forms of expertise from below. On the demand side
more expertise is requested, and the range of requesting actors includes politics,
firms, NGOs and citizens (Brown 2009). Experts combine knowledge with its
interpretation, and most crucially with an action orientation, making abstract
knowledge actionable, or advising clients on how to act in the absence of certain
knowledge.7 These are important pointers to be remembered for the argument below.
Stephen Turner (2001) attempts to provide a typology of expertise, looking at the
supply and demand side. On the supply side he gives examples ranging from
economists, theologians, public administrators and social workers, and from single
intellectuals to think tanks. On the demand side he identifies governments (‘high
politics’), public administration (‘bureaucratic apparatus’), NGOs, business firms,
and citizens. This leads to a typology of expertise, based on different modes of
claiming and requesting cognitive authority. Perhaps the most important issue here
is the expert’s relation to an audience and clientele. It is crucial who commissions or
pays for the expertise, and how clients come to trust it. It is also appropriate to
distinguish between experts that advise ‘high politics’ and those that provide advice
to other social users, such as charities or general audiences.
In Table 1 I provide a simplified version of this typology, presenting supply and
demand functions in different actor constellations. On the supply side, I distinguish
between scientific, professional and field expertise. On the demand side, I
distinguish between politics, business, NGOs and private citizens. I use the term
‘field experts’ to denote the kind of ubiquitous expertise that has been identified as
6 Reasons for this rising demand have been identified as a loss of tradition, rise of individualism,
complexity of social life, the growth in the range of social actions in which individuals engage and the
attendant insecurity (see Beck 1992).
7 In this process experts often disagree, as (Mazur 1973: 251) noted: ‘The theories, models, procedures
and formulae of science and technology are generally believed to allow one trained in their use simply to
calculate an unambiguously correct answer. A technologist or scientist soon comes to recognise that the
complex technical problems of the state-of-the-art require subtle perceptions of the sort which cannot be
easily articulated in explicit form. When it is necessary to make a simplifying assumption, and many are
reasonable, which simplifying assumption should be made? When data are lacking on a question, how far
may one reasonably extrapolate from data of other sources? How trustworthy is a set of empirical
observations? These questions all require judgements for which there are no formalised guides and it is
here that experts frequently disagree’.
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important by much of the literature. The examples should help in describing some
essential roles and help us identify the specific type of expert-client interaction that
is examined by different approaches discussed below.
Before I do this, I want to take a quick look at the example of field expertise in
health care as opposed to legal settings, to take two old professional domains.
Medical doctors are part of the medical profession but they did not necessarily
produce the knowledge they are using when treating patients. They are not scientists
but medical experts (in the sense of consultants—in English a specialist doctor is
called appropriately consultant).8
Likewise, lawyers did not necessarily produce the knowledge they are applying
when making a case. By way of contrast, the legal expertise seems to be much less
challenged by field expertise. It is an open question if this is due to professional
strategies of defending their specialist status or to their legally granted monopoly
status. There are no comparable Internet platforms run by field experts as is the case
in the medical domain, and the evidence seems to suggest that defendants without
professional legal counsel fare worse in front of the courts (Sandefur 2015).
In what follows I will critically discuss five approaches from the literature in STS
that have conceptualised expertise. I will show their limitations and argue for an
alternative approach that takes into account the double relation of expertise,
between experts and clients; and between experts and decision-making.
Five Influential Views and Their Problems
Laboratory Studies
Harry Collins has made a very visible contribution for the analysis of expertise in
contemporary society (Collins and Evans 2002, 2007; Collins 1985, 2014a,b). He
Table 1 Typology of expertise
Supply Demand
Government Business NGOs Citizens
Scientific experts Advisory
committee
Consultancy Member,
advisor
Media exposure
Professional
experts
Lawyers, engineers
etc.
Consultancy Lawyers Lawyers, doctors, financial
advisors
Field experts Roundtables,
deliberative
democracy
Crowdsourcing Members,
supporters
Patient groups, action groups,
online blogs, self-help advice
8 The notion of lay expertise is mainly applied in research about medial settings, see, for example, Akrich
and Rabeharisoa (2012). The locus classicus is Epstein (1995: 408) who claims that ‘AIDS treatment
activists have constituted themselves as credible participants in the process of knowledge construction,
thereby bringing about changes in the epistemic practices of biomedical research’. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to assess to what extent this is a valid description or if this is another instance of emerging
expertise at the interface between knowledge production and application.
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affirms the point made above about the difference in urgency within politics and
science. Different time scales apply in policy decisions and scientific research: one
is urgent; the other always needs more time to do further research.
Collins and Evans critically review the move in science studies towards
relativizing faith in science, and attendant calls for an extension of scientific
expertise. They argue that there are good reasons to give scientific expertise a
special place in society and its decision-making procedures:
‘One of the most important contributions of the sociology of scientific
knowledge (SSK) has been to make it much harder to make the claim: ‘‘Trust
scientists because they have special access to the truth’’. Our question is: ‘‘If it
is no longer clear that scientists and technologists have special access to the
truth, why should their advice be specially valued?’’ This, we think, is the
pressing intellectual problem of the age’ (Collins and Evans 2002: 236).
Collins and Evans pose a related question about the scope of non-scientists’
participation in decision-making: ‘How far should participation in technical
decision-making extend?’ Science studies have shown that there is ‘more to
scientific and technical expertise than is encompassed in the work of formally
accredited scientists and technologists, but it has not told us how much more’
(Collins and Evans 2002: 237).
Two important issues are to note here. One is about participation in decision-
making, the other about participation in knowledge creation. Collins and Evans’s
term ‘socio-technical decision-making’ seems to relate to both. However, the
authors do not elaborate on the potential ambiguity of this term. Instead, they
introduce another distinction, between interactional and contributory expertise. The
first is defined as ‘enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants’, the
second as ‘enough expertise to contribute to the science’. According to Collins
(Collins 2014b: 65), one becomes a contributory expert ‘by working with other
contributory experts and picking up their skills and techniques’. Interactional
expertise, on the other hand, can be acquired by deep immersion in the linguistic
discourse of the relevant scientific domain.
The distinction between interactional and contributory expertise makes sense if
one wants to theorize the role of a scientific expert, more precisely, the role of an
experimental scientist, and Collins’s own work has nearly exclusively focused on
such cases. The notion of a core-set of scientists, which he introduced in his study of
gravitational wave research (Collins 1985), has later been applied in his work about
expertise for policy decisions (Collins and Evans 2002). What counts for him are
core-set competencies that can only be acquired through practical participation on
the laboratory bench. Only in this way can scientists gain the important tacit
knowledge, and only in this way can scientists as experts claim to make competent
statements.
The laboratory as the site of knowledge creation, and the scientific institute which
signals competence of the researcher and thus makes her a ‘certified expert’ is not
the only source of expert knowledge, and it is arguably not the most important one
when it comes to political decision-making (see Jasanoff 2003 for a similar
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critique).9 Laboratories as sources of power have been posited by several authors
conducting ethnographies of laboratories in the 1970s and 80s (Latour 1983). This
special focus has perhaps led to an unwarranted generalization in terms of political
theory.
Another aspect of the core-set terminology is worth noting. In his book Changing
Order, Collins drew attention to the fact that core-sets are not only or mainly
distinguished by competencies but by gate-keeping activities. Collins argued that
social factors crucially decided what counted as expertise, because there is no
independent criterion available that could provide a standard for judging the
competence of researchers and their knowledge claims at the frontier of new
knowledge creation. Remember: Changing Order dealt with the problem of
experimental replication and the attendant issue of experimenter’s regress. In
Collins’s later work on expertise, the contributory quality of core-sets is contrasted
with the interactive expertise of those outside the core-set. The separation is made
on the basis of core competence, not on the basis of social mechanisms of gate-
keeping. In Changing Order Collins was at pains to show that there was nothing
inherently superior in one researcher’s quality or experimental skill compared to
another. All depended on the social processes of gaining a standing within the core
set. Now he holds that the sociological observer can evaluate the relative merit of
expertise. This is a radical shift in perspective and not mentioned prominently.10
Hand in hand with the switch in perspective goes the adoption of a ‘realist’ theory of
expertise, such that an expert remains an expert even if no clients acknowledge their
expertise. This ‘realist’ theory of expertise is opposed to the ‘relational’ view of
expertise that I put forward in this paper.
Bruno Latour, like Collins, started his academic career doing laboratory studies
and, like Collins, conceives of laboratories as sources of power. He does not deal
with the role of the expert in society in a separate publication. In his oeuvre he
mentions the notion of expertise in passing, referring to the meaning of a specialist
with experience, quoting the term experitus. For him an expert seems to be a
specialist who has the luxury to work in the dark, where he can commit many errors,
in contrast to the politician, who has to make all errors in public (Latour 1993:
225).11 Latour’s real attention is less on the role of experts, but on the role of science
and scientists, on the role of laboratories as sources of political power, and on the
similarity between science and politics.
His framework of actor-networks dispenses with explanation and only tries to
describe networks, their reach, composition and growth over time. Through this
9 Besides, one would expect that deep immersion for an extended period of time would allow participants
to develop contributory expertise. It is surprising that Collins thinks otherwise. Maybe he overgeneralizes
his own experience when he says that decades of close contact to the community of gravitational wave
researchers has not allowed him to become a contributor, even after he successfully accomplished
something like a Turing test (Collins 2014b: 69–71).
10 Collins might reply that he provides the rationale of the ‘three waves of science studies’ to justify this
re-orientation. Changing Order would be a testimony to his working within wave two which he now
thinks to be limited, and in need of extension.
11 Perhaps this was written with the example of France in mind. In the USA, being an expert does not
protect them from being publicly exposed and even sued.
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description he wants to show, and critically examine, the genesis of established
facts. However, established facts here pertain to a situation where despite
uncertainty, and a competition of knowledge claims, a society comes to a
conclusion of how to regulate a specific problem. This is why Latourian networks
have no limits, and it does not make sense to speak about ‘natural’, ‘social’,
‘political’, or ‘scientific’ factors. This flat ontology does not recognize the problem
of political decision-making as a discrete issue, and the role of expertise in the
process.12
This short review of laboratory studies indicates that they are a mixed blessing
for the ability of the field of STS when tackling the problem of expertise in society.
They have focused on scientists and their practices, and their involvement in a wider
net of relations. Political and institutional analysis has been a weak point in this
field. In what follows I will look at contributions from authors that have a different
theoretical agenda, focusing on the question of political decision-making in modern
democracies where expert knowledge is seen as vitally important.
Expertise and Counter-Expertise: The Politics of Knowledge
Back in the 1980s, analysing controversies about leaded gasoline, IQ testing, and
smoking and lung cancer, Collingridge and Reeve (1986) distinguished between two
scenarios where specialist knowledge and political decision-making are linked. In
the first (‘under-critical model’) a policy consensus exists before research is
undertaken. Scientific evidence merely legitimizes predefined policy options. In the
second (‘over-critical model’) there is a succession of claims from experts and
counter-experts without any agreement. Instead of a policy consensus we get
endless technical debates. Collingridge and Reeve contrast several myths and
realities of science and decision-making, for example, that science yields true and
reliable knowledge (which they think is a myth), whereas in reality politicians use
scientific information to justify their decisions. This leads them to abandon the idea
that expertise is something that can be derived from the model of scientific research.
Quite rightly they point to the fact that decision-makers are used to decisions under
uncertainty, they do not try to collect comprehensive data before making a decision
(see also Lindblom 1959).13 Nevertheless, reference to scientific knowledge claims
seems to be important because all lobby groups in a policy arena tend to use them,
and because scientific knowledge has higher prestige than other forms of
knowledge.
‘The role of scientific research and analysis is therefore not the heroic one of
providing truths by which policy may be guided, but the ironic one of
12 However, in a recent talk about climate change, Latour (2013) does consider the nature of politics
which he defines as an agonistic field, following Carl Schmitt. Perhaps the turn from ‘matters of fact’ to
‘matters of concern’ (see Latour 2004) has led him to consider a framework in which political aspects
become important and can be addressed as such. In his book Politics of Nature, Latour also outlines a set
of different institutions with specific functions (see Brown 2009).
13 The European climate change policy development is a case in point. It is perhaps little known that at
the time of the founding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), EU officials declared
that we know enough in order to act (Liberatore 1994: 192).
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preventing policy being formulated around some technical conclusions.
Research on one hypothesis ought to cancel out research on others, enabling
policy to be made which is insensitive to all scientific conjectures’
(Collingridge and Reeve 1986: 32).14
However, their distinction between two modes of decision-making (under- and
over-critical) seems too rigid to cover the dynamics of the politics of knowledge.
After all, sometimes we do get policy decisions after a period of seemingly endless
technical debate. And there are examples where a policy consensus is undermined
by emerging knowledge claims, as witnessed by constant scientific and technolog-
ical innovation. While the authors make an important point that in modern societies
knowledge is likely to be used in legitimizing or blocking specific political
decisions, their notion of expertise is largely restricted to scientific expertise.
Regulatory Science
In their study of advisory committees Salter et al. (1988) argued that there is a
significant difference between science and scientific research, on the one hand, and
knowledge that is applied to solve policy issues, on the other. They called the latter
mandated science, in order to draw attention to this type of science that is not the
outcome of an autonomous research process (a` la Merton or Polanyi), but
commissioned by public agencies keen to get specific and practical advice on
regulatory policy issues.
‘Our image of scientists pictures them at work in the laboratory; we seldom raise
the question of how scientific information moves from the laboratory to the world of
politics and policy making’ (Salter et al. 1988: 1).
The work of such committees uses all the terms we are used to hear about
scientific research, such as literature review, or peer review, but the purpose of
mandated science is not to produce new scientific findings. Its point is to make a
judgement about multiple sources of evidence, resulting in a recommendation to a
pressing problem of public policy. The authors put it this way:
‘Mandated science must be understood as a separate sphere of scientific
work… Increasingly, decision makers and their publics are placed in a
quandary. On one hand they are increasingly dependent on science and
scientists… on the other hand it is increasingly apparent that science cannot
provide the clear answers that governments seek, at least not at the time when
regulatory decisions are required. Moreover, science often provides conflicting
answers …’ (Salter et al. 1988: 4).15
While the book by Salter at al. received little attention, Sheila Jasanoff’s work on
advisory committees was to become highly visible, mainly through her book The
Fifth Branch in which she addresses the issue of expertise, using the term regulatory
14 This is similar to Max Weber’s statement that ‘the ruler…keeps one expert in check by others’ (Weber
1978: 995).
15 See also (Weinberg 1972: 209) who famously said that there are ‘questions which can be asked of
science yet cannot be answered by science’.
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science. In the opening chapter she lists three major findings from the sociology of
science ‘that must be taken into account in any serious discussion of scientific
advising’ (Jasanoff 1990: 12). These are: (1) Scientific facts are socially
constructed; (2) Scientific paradigms and social prestige are important for problems
facing advisory committees; (3) Through boundary work scientists decide who
belongs to relevant professional and policy communities, thus holding up an
appearance of scientific authority even in the face of uncertainty. Like Salter
et al., Jasanoff draws an explicit comparison between conventional science and
regulatory science. In so doing she addresses a shortcoming of Collins’s work
(mentioned above). Experts are not only or mainly in their position as experts
because of their technical competence but because of mechanisms of social
inclusion/exclusion.
Jasanoff contrasts a technocratic with a democratic model of science advice (see
also Habermas 1971; Irwin 1995) and concludes that neither ‘captures accurately
what is at stake in decisions that are at once scientific and political. The notion that
the scientific component of decision-making can be separated from the political and
entrusted to independent experts has effectively been dismantled by recent
contributions of the political and social studies of science’. And, even more
strongly: ‘The idea that scientists can speak truth to power in a value-free manner
has emerged as a myth without correlates in reality’ (Jasanoff 1990: 17, echoing
Collingridge and Reeve). But is this the most important question to ask when trying
to understand the role of expertise in decision-making? Would the science policy
world be different if scientists were providing advice in a value-free manner? I
suggest that it is more relevant to emphasize that the qualification and skill of the
scientists is not closely linked to the decision context. Their knowledge often cannot
provide the answers decision-makers request, as Salter et al. have shown.
Outlining the structure and rationale of the argument of her book, Jasanoff
emphasizes the central role of scholarship from the sociology of science, beyond the
‘expected’ fields of law, political science and policy analysis. While the central role
of knowledge is highlighted, the focus on its scientific nature posits a problematic,
and perhaps unwarranted, assumption.16
Writing on experts as policy advisors, Jasanoff (1990: 229) points out that ‘experts
themselves seem at times painfully aware that what they are doing is not ‘‘science’’ in
any ordinary sense, but a hybrid activity that combines elements of scientific evidence
and reasoningwith large doses of social and political judgment’. This statement captures
perhaps the most important aspect of expertise. In a more recent paper, Jasanoff (2011:
21) emphasizes the role of the expert as a translator ormediator between knowledge and
decision-making, quite akin to what I propose here. However, her concept of the expert
seems to depict them as professionals: ‘it is not science per se that speaks unmediated to
power, but […] the bridge between science and politics is built by experts, a cadre of
knowledgeable professionals’. Occluded from this conceptualization is a kind of
expertise that is not based on esoteric science, and not located within a profession. We
shall now turn to a body of literature that conceptualizes the role of lay expertise.
16 Jasanoff’s arguments about expertise are informed by the choice of her cases, which are scientific and
professional advisors providing expertise for government, see Table 1.
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Lay Expertise
Brian Wynne (1996) is usually credited with the insight that lay people can be
experts, too. His famous study of Cumbrian sheep showed farmers exposed to the
radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the government
interference in their daily farming practices. Wynne argued that while government
scientists made authoritative statements about the radioactive decay in the farmers’
soil, the farmers themselves knew something else about the nature of their herds and
the requirements of animal husbandry. After all, the issue was how to solve the
tension between radiation risks and maintaining the farmers’ livelihoods. However,
the government scientists and the farmers had specialized knowledge about different
things, and both had their own interests. The local knowledge of the farmers was
based on experience and self-interest, while the government experts relied on
abstract models and an interest to reassure the farmers and the public, apart from
keeping their monopoly status as provider of certified, reliable knowledge.
Wynne’s call for an inclusion of the farmers in decision-making, and being critical of
the arrogance of state authority has proven immensely influential with scholars in STS
and deliberative democracy circles. But there is a question to be asked about which
social groups represented which expertise. Wynne shows how government scientists
provided laboratory and abstract expertise that first gave false reassurances but then
ordered a drastic restriction in movement of sheep. It is not clear what difference in
policy recommendations would have been following from the farmers’ lay expertise,
apart from the obvious economic aspect of financial compensation for the loss of sheep.
Wynne does provide some hints about the economic dimensions of the decisions
at stake. Hill farmers were dependent on their lambs, which were raised after Easter
and sold in the autumn, mainly to European markets. They needed to be sold at the
right time, being neither too lean, nor too fat. Any indication or suspicion that the
lambs were radioactively contaminated would massively devalue them and thus
pose an immediate and direct threat to the farmers’ livelihoods. What was the right
thing to do given the circumstances of radioactive contamination of soil and herds?
This is a question that is never explicitly addressed in Wynne’s account. We hear
about the distrust of local farmers vis-a`-vis the government scientists and a history
of local radioactive pollution, following the Windscale disaster in 1957, which was
probably covered up by government secrecy. But given the situation post-
Chernobyl, what were the options for the farmers, and for the government? What
was in the public interest, and what in the farmers’ interests? Was there a difference
between the two? How did the expertise of the government scientists and that of the
Cumbrian farmers answer these questions? While Wynne’s account tells the story of
an apparently confused and haphazard government intervention it does not tell us
much about the farmers’ demands with regard to managing the crisis.
For example, Wynne relates that ‘[a]lthough the farmers accepted the need for
restrictions, they could not accept the experts’ apparent ignorance of the effects of
their approach on the normally flexible and informal system of hill farm
management. This experience of expert knowledge being out of touch with
practical reality and thus of no validity was often repeated with diverse concrete
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illustrations in interviews’ (Wynne 1989: 34). In addition, conflicts about the rules
for compensation emerged which left the farmers embittered.
The culture and social identity of the hill farmers are mentioned as important
factors when assessing the divergent ways of dealing with the risk of radioactive
fallout on the Cumbrian hills. As Wynne points out, the farmers’ expertise was not
codified anywhere, it was passed down the generations orally and by
apprenticeship.17
In sum then, Wynne’s point is not that the hill farmers have developed some kind
of counter-expertise that would have led to different policy recommendations.
Rather, he is concerned about the interests and social identity of the hill farming
community. The only engagement the farmers had with government experts from
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food highlighted its contradictory nature,
leading to completely different courses of action.18
Michel Callon (1999) has taken up the point about the patronising effects
government scientists can have on citizens. He emphasizes the complementarity of
expert and lay expertise, acknowledging that both are prisoners of their own beliefs
but that lay experts, in addition, fear ‘that that someone else may decide for them
what is good for them, and that such decisions would be taken without the slightest
knowledge of their needs or wishes’ (Callon 1999: 88; see also Roszak 1969).
This is an important insight. It underlines the fact that different forms of expertise
may be competing, and that specific kinds of expertise align with specific social
interests. Callon mentions those affected by official expertise, a scientific or
technocratic undertaking that is perceived as threatening by those affected. One
could argue that these scientific experts themselves are trying to protect their
interests, too. But there is a difference in that the lay experts often cannot act in a
symmetrical way, and thus they do not have the same kind of control over events.
Callon’s approach would be compatible with a view that defines expertise in the
way I am proposing here. In this view, both lay experts and official experts mediate
between a body of knowledge and decision contexts. Both need to fight for
recognition and acceptance (albeit the official expert may have an advantage in this
game, especially under conditions where access to elites is important). The nature of
the knowledge in both cases is not essential to the framework: it could be a body of
scientific knowledge, it could be a body of practical knowledge, of tacit, or secret
knowledge (see Stehr and Grundmann 2005).19 The important aspect is that
expertise mediates between a body of knowledge and its application. Scientists
could fulfil this role but they are not the only group.
17 It could be suggested that the hill farmers relied on a highly complex and tightly coupled system which
made failure under stress likely, cf. Perrow (1999).
18 There seems to be some evidence that the hill farmers had a better relationship with the local Institute
for Terrestrial Ecology which ‘was most fortunate in this respect because, as a locally based institution, it
had the closest such practical contact. Through the farmers’ informal grapevine, it subsequently gained a
reputation as being plainspeaking, open about uncertainty, independent, and trustworthy’ (Wynne 1989:
38).
19 The asymmetry between corporate and government expertise, on the one hand, and lay expertise, on
the other, is perhaps most pronounced in the area of surveillance, as Edward Snowden’s revelations have
shown.
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Wynne and Callon have touched upon the notion of stakeholder inclusion which
becomes even more prominent in the framework of Post-normal Science, a situation
in which ‘[s]takes are high, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, and decisions
urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Ravetz 1999). This framework explicitly
drops the distinction between the action-oriented urgency of politics and the absence
of such pressure within science, a distinction introduced at the beginning of this
paper and emphasized by Collins.
In postnormal situations science and decision-making become closely coupled.
Does this bridge the gap between science and politics? Or is this entanglement a
hindrance for decision-making? The authors believe that credible solutions must
rely on the legitimation of public participation. Science should stop pretending that
it can provide reliable knowledge for decisions. Under conditions of uncertainty and
value conflict, experts and lay people are alike, and should be given equal treatment
in the process:
‘Persons directly affected by an environmental problem will have a keener
awareness of its symptoms, and a more pressing concern with the quality of
official reassurances, than those in any other role. Thus they perform a
function analogous to that of professional colleagues in the peer review or
refereeing process in traditional science, which otherwise might not occur in
these new contexts’ (Ravetz 1993: 649).
In a similar way to Wynne, the authors hold that official expertise and lay expertise
should be seen as complimentary, not as antagonistic:
‘The Post-Normal Science approach should not be interpreted as an attack on
the accredited experts, but rather as assistance. The world of ‘‘normal science’’
in which they were trained has its place in any scientific study of the
environment, but it needs to be supplemented by awareness of the ‘post-
normal’ nature of the problems we now confront’ (Ravetz 1993: 653).
Here the stakeholder engagement is modelled explicitly on the institution of peer
review as practiced within scientific communities. But it is not obvious what the
reason for inclusion is: is it the lay knowledge of stakeholders, or is it the democratic
principle of inclusion of stakeholders, irrespective of their status as experts?
If lay people have special knowledge that is thought to be essential, or at least an
important complement to the specialist (scientific or professional) knowledge, this
needs to be spelled out. If, on the other hand, lay people are seen as equally entitled
to make judgements in the face of uncertainty, as the experts are, then the rationale
for including them is a principle of democracy.
Yearley (2000: 109) states: ‘Funtowicz and Ravetz stress that citizen involve-
ment is proposed by them not because they are committed to the furthest extension
of democracy, but because the involvement of a larger group of peers, with different
kinds of knowledge, will be beneficial to the production of high-quality knowledge’.
In this interpretation PNS would improve our knowledge of the world, where in
another reading it would lead to better decisions. Proponents of this latter view have
pointed out that there is a similar interest in policy studies which should be taken
into account:
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‘It is crucial now for scholars of PNS to make explicit reference to other
heuristic concepts such as ‘‘deliberative policy analysis’’ (…) which empha-
size the importance of governance and institutionalizing of participation and
account for social construction in politics and science’ (Turnpenny et al. 2011).
In contrast to science-based notions of expertise, the contributions in this section
emphasize lay expertise and lay-expert interaction and thematize the importance of
stakeholder participation. However, they stop short of conceptualizing the
fundamental difference between knowledge production and decision contexts, and
the attendant question of the specific properties of the knowledge, ‘the type of
knowledge’ that can be used for decision purposes. It does not address in sufficient
detail how stakeholder representation relates to the question of knowledge
production and application.
The upshot of this section is that expertise is conceptualized in largely scientific
terms, or else tries to involve lay people in decision-making where it remains
unclear what their expertise rests upon. Expertise is discussed either in close
analogy to a scientific ideal, neglecting the role of non-scientific experts (field
experts), or ideals of political participation are brought in which are modelled on
scientific practices (extended peer review). Also unexamined is the relation between
interests and ideas which seems to be crucial in this context.
Honest Brokers
A conceptual refinement of the role of the scientist as expert in the policy advisory
process has been developed by Roger Pielke Jr. (2007). His typology identifies
different roles of scientists engaged in different ways with a decision-making
process. These roles are presented as pure scientist, science arbiter, issue advocate,
and honest broker. He calls them experts, but on several occasions he also uses the
term ‘scientists and other experts’ (without defining what these ‘other experts’
might be). The pure scientist has no interest in the decision-making process and
simply wants to share information about facts. ‘The Science Arbiter serves as a
resource for the decision-maker, standing ready to answer factual questions that the
decision-maker thinks are relevant. The Science Arbiter does not tell the decision-
maker what he or she ought to prefer’ (Pielke Jr. 2007: 2).
In contrast, the issue advocate tries to convince the decision-maker of one best
course of action. Finally, the honest broker leaves it to the decision-maker to reduce
the options and to make a choice: ‘The defining characteristic of the honest broker
of policy alternatives is an effort to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of choice
for decision-making in a way that allows for the decision-maker to reduce choice
based on his or her own preferences and values’ (Pielke Jr. 2007: 2–3).
A characteristic of both honest brokers and issue advocates is an explicit
engagement of decision alternatives whereas the pure scientist and science arbiter are
not concerned with a specific decision, but instead serve as information resources.
Unlike the science arbiter, the honest broker seeks explicitly to integrate
scientific knowledge with stakeholder concerns in the form of alternative possible
courses of action.
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I noted above that scientists often do not have the knowledge which could serve
and justify a specific policy. This gap between what is known in scientific terms and
what would be needed to know for practical purposes can be exploited on both sides
of the science policy interface. Pielke Jr. (2007: 77) argues that:
‘Contemporary science policies create strong incentives for scientists to wage
political battles through science by emphasizing the roles of Pure Scientist and
Science Arbiter in all cases, when in fact an advocacy position is actually
being expressed. At the core of the argument presented here is a critique of the
longstanding expectation that science can and should be separated from
considerations of the applications of science’.
Pielke argues that the social influence of experts on the policy process is strong:
‘Democracy is a competitive system in which the public is allowed to
participate by voicing their views on alternatives presented to them in the
political process. Such alternatives do not come up from the grassroots any
more than you or I telling an auto mechanic what the options are for fixing a
broken car. Policy alternatives come from experts. It is the role of experts in
such a system to clarify the implications of their knowledge for action and to
provide such implications in the form of policy alternatives to decision-makers
who can then decide among different possible courses of action’ (Pielke Jr.
2007: 12; see Brown 2008 for a critique).
Two aspects need further elaboration here; for one, it is not clear that only experts
(in the sense of scientific experts) introduce policy options into the political process.
Like previous frameworks reviewed here, Pielke conceives of experts by and large
as scientists of some sort. Secondly, the notion of honest brokers could be seen as
misleading. It could indicate that other roles are not honest, or that some brokering
is not honest. It would be a difficult judgement, depending on the merits of each
case, to evaluate the honesty of such brokering. The main problem with the term,
however, is the suggestion that experts as experts could somehow be independent
from the decision process which they have been asked to join. Brokers make
matches, select options, and suggest courses of action. In this sense experts are
brokers20, and it would be problematic to restrict their role to a widening of policy
options. Perhaps Pielke does not see this because he holds on to the ideal of
impartiality as a virtue of experts.21
Discussion
The argument so far has explored different conceptualizations of experts and
expertise. It has advocated a relational concept of expertise, and emphasized the
proliferation of expertise in the knowledge society. Several (but not all) of the
20 This goes against the definition given by Meyer cited above.
21 As has been noted, honest brokering in Pielke’s sense is most likely to apply in collective advisory
bodies, and not at the level of the individual expert (see Grundmann 2012).
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approaches discussed above focus on scientists as providers of expertise, and all
thematize government and private citizens as clients of expertise. The role of
expertise for business and NGOs seems to be a blind spot.22
This still leaves open the question of how the expertise relates to decision-
making.
Let us revisit Turner’s work and an intriguing comment on expertise provided to
a public authority. He says the problem with advisory bodies is that ‘the evidence is
not enough to guide practice unequivocally, and that some sort of fraught step, even
a leap, is needed to get from the evidence to practice. The reason for these
institutions is this: the science alone—the ‘‘evidence,’’ in this phrase—is
insufficient, conflicting, or simply not in a form that can guide practice. But
practice is necessary, ongoing, and consequential. So the process of bridging the gap
needs to be helped along’ (Turner 2010: 253, orig. emph.).
This very insight brings us back to the beginning of this paper and the
sociological notion that knowledge and action are often disconnected and that action
often precedes knowledge. The example of advisory bodies advising high politics is
instructive here, and also for other types of expertise. Robert Oppenheimer
famously suggested that ‘there are formidable differences between the problems of
science and those of practice. The method of science cannot be directly adapted to
the solution of problems in politics and in man’s spiritual life’ (cited in Shapin
2008: 70).
A private person, like a government, knows that the evidence often is not
enough—it may be contradictory or obscure. A leap is necessary, which all too often
is a leap of faith. An advisor can bridge the gap, so to speak. The same logic applies
to other social groups requesting expertise, such as companies and civil society
originations. If this is the case, the social attributes of expertise come to the fore.
They have been described as defining an issue, reducing complexity, creating trust,
and identifying courses of action (Stehr and Grundmann 2011). Nevertheless, there
is a difference between citizens searching for expertise, and corporate bodies doing
so. The former is usually genuinely interested in the best advice for the best course
of action, while the latter has either chosen a decision for which expertise can
provide legitimation, or else wants to use expertise in a political power game.
The link between knowledge and decision-making has been obscured or
neglected in the literature to some extent. One can speculate about the reasons. It
could be that several approaches after the 1970s (post ‘wave 1’ in Collins’ terms)
have given up on a conceptual separation between science and politics (but see
Luhmann 1990; Merton 1973; Weingart 2001). The resulting conceptual ‘hybrid’
frameworks have led to three strategies in dealing with the problem of expertise:
1. Equating expertise with scientific expertise while at the same time conceptu-
alizing scientific expertise as a hybrid of science and politics (and possibly more,
as expressed in the frameworks of ‘co-production’ and Actor-Network-Theory);
2. Equating theoretical knowledge with practical knowledge;
22 For an exception with regard to business expertise, see Pollock and Williams (2016). Of course,
business consultancy is a constant topic in the management literature but does not advance theoretical
frameworks.
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3. Elevating (or diminishing) lay expertise without making sufficiently clear what
epistemic status lay knowledge has.
In so doing, a potential confusion has arisen that makes it difficult to investigate
the link between knowledge and decision-making. In strategy 1 such a link would be
an artifact of an obsolete distinction between science (or more generally:
knowledge) and politics. This verdict is borne out of many studies in STS that
have shown that in specific cases of science policy interactions it is impossible to
demarcate science and politics. Maybe such a claim is the result of a specific
research interest (historical reconstruction) and research methodology (case
studies). A research programme of ‘following the actors’ (Latour 1987) will show
persons and institutions that are embodiments of several roles and functions. For
such an approach posing the theoretical question of how knowledge and decision-
making are linked becomes an anomalous question that cannot be answered—or has
been answered in that the link is always already present.23
In strategy 2 little attention is paid to the question what kind of knowledge is
needed for decision-making. More could be said about this, making use of the
distinction between knowledge for practice and practical knowledge (see Grund-
mann and Stehr 2012 for an extensive discussion). This needs emphasizing, since
the pragmatic relevance of knowledge cannot be assumed a priori. Several
conditions must be met if knowledge is to be turned into knowledge for action. The
successful application of knowledge in concrete situations for action requires that
knowledge is geared towards application (often it is not); that possibilities for action
exist; and that the decision-maker has appropriate latitude for action, i.e. is able to
shape events. These different elements must be linked together, in order that
knowledge may become practical knowledge through decisions and their imple-
mentation. In other words, scientific knowledge is not sufficient–other knowledge
forms may well be required–and experts needs to be able to identify levers of action
that exist in reality and that can be moved (Stehr and Grundmann 2011).
The insistence on the difference between esoteric scientific or professional
knowledge and lay reasoning is valid but misguided. Of course, there are differences
in skill and mastery of a specific domain of knowledge. What is relevant for
decision contexts is the ability to relate knowledge claims to the decision-making
context, to define a situation and to identify options for intervention. Often there is
competition in the supply of these services, but not always, as the case of law seems
to show. If one were to privilege scientists and professionals, this would not
necessarily lead to better advice (as their esoteric knowledge could be irrelevant or
detrimental for action) but put them into this role qua authority. Knowledge without
expertise is the specter haunting this approach.
In strategy 3 the fact is recognized that expertise is widely distributed in society
and that expertise is not to be assimilated, or restricted to scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, the problem remains of how one can understand this kind of expertise
23 Of course, there is also much insightful work in STS studies of expertise that shows that the separation
of science and politics is a practical result of boundary work (Gieryn 1983; Jasanoff 1990). In this way
scientists are presumed to have agency in deciding what exactly counts as legitimate scientific knowledge
and practice, and what does not.
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in terms of its epistemic contribution to decision-making. Collins’s term ‘interac-
tional expertise’ defines this as a great achievement but sees it still lacking the final
ingredient to be complete, ‘contributory’ expertise. Wynne’s term lay expertise
seems to indicate that there are ‘real’ experts, and then there are lay experts, who
happen to have an interest in a social or political issue. The term stakeholder
normally describes this role, and not all stakeholders are per se experts. They may
articulate an interest in an issue, preferring one decision to another, based on their
special interests. It is an open question of how they contribute to the understanding
of an issue and what kind of expertise they contribute. In principle, lobby groups can
make valid points, even if they are surrounded by suspicion (‘they would say that,
wouldn’t they?’) Be that as it may, stakeholders as lay experts cannot be expected to
be impartial (which is not to say that conventional experts, traditionally conceived,
are impartial either).
Conclusion
The notion of expertise in knowledge societies poses a theoretical challenge.
Several approaches in STS (with some notable exceptions) have used the ideal of
the scientist when conceptualising expertise, and conceive of expertise as something
to be possessed. This neglects the relational aspect of expertise. The rise of field
experts is acknowledged by many authors but their role as stakeholders and interest
groups vis-a`-vis knowledge producers remains obscure.
The review of five frameworks on expertise has revealed some interesting
features, and some lack of perspective. The interesting features have to do with the
limited function of science to provide reliable knowledge for practical political
purposes, and a need to complement the decision-making process with stakeholder
groups that originate outside science. There is a growing realization that expertise is
ubiquitous. However, this literature also shows to some extent the fixation with
scientific and professional knowledge as the standard of reference when talking
about expertise, and a neglect of political and institutional aspects of decision-
making (see also Jasanoff 2003).
Future research needs to take into account relevant contributions from political
science, policy studies, the sociology of professions, and international relations
(Abbott 1988; Eyal 2013; Fischer 2009; Haas 2004; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier
2008). The literature on policy networks seems especially relevant in this context
(Grundmann 2001; Moran et al. 2008). There are lessons to be taken on board across
disciplines. However, for the present purpose, the point is to demonstrate the benefit
of a conceptual innovation that understands expertise as relational, and as mediating
between knowledge production and application, thus enabling novel ways of dealing
with expertise in the knowledge society, linking knowledge to decision-making.
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